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A Matter of Opinion∗ 
KEITH FRANKISH 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of  human psychology. It takes its 
start from Daniel Dennett’s distinction between belief  and opinion, arguing that it has 
the power to account for a number of  tensions within our commonsense concept of  
belief. It argues, however, that Dennett’s account is seriously inadequate, particularly in 
its treatment of  the role of  opinion in practical reasoning. The paper goes on to 
sketch an alternative proposal which retains the virtues of  Dennett’s suggestion, while 
providing a richer and more satisfying account of  the cognitive role of  opinion. 
 
1. Introduction 
Most theorists writing about belief  share a common assumption. This is that 
belief  is a unitary phenomenon – that whenever we ascribe a belief  to a person, 
creature, or system, we ascribe essentially the same kind of  state. Of  course, no 
one denies that belief  has varied aspects and manifestations – it is widely 
accepted that beliefs can be both occurrent or standing-state, tacit or explicit, 
conscious or non-conscious, and so on. But it is generally assumed that these 
are different aspects or variants of  a single fundamental kind of  state. So 
occurrent beliefs can be thought of  as activations of  standing-state beliefs, tacit 
beliefs as dispositions to form explicit beliefs, conscious beliefs as beliefs that are 
the object of  higher-order beliefs and so on.  
 There have, however, been dissenting voices, suggesting that this apparent 
uniformity masks an important psychological distinction. Some writers 
distinguish passive belief  from active judgement. Epistemologists, too, 
commonly mark a distinction between graded belief  and flat-out acceptance. And 
Daniel Dennett has argued that we should distinguish nonverbal beliefs from a 
class of  language-involving cognitive states which he calls opinions. The 
distinction between the two states is, he claims, a very important one: 
My hunch is that a proper cognitive psychology is going to have to make a 
sharp distinction between beliefs and opinions, that the psychology of 
opinions is really going to be rather different from the psychology of beliefs, 
and that the sorts of architecture that will do very well by, say, nonlinguistic 
                                                 
∗  This is an e-print of an article published in Philosophical Psychology, 11 (4), 1998, pp. 423-42. 
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perceptual beliefs ... is going to have to be supplemented rather substantially 
in order to handle opinions. (1991b, p. 26; cf. 1991c, p. 143) 
A view of  this kind has some attractions. For example, it can be argued that 
full-blown intentionality requires certain conceptual abilities that are 
unavailable to languageless creatures (Bennett 1964; Davidson 1975, 1982). 
Anyone impressed by such arguments, yet unwilling to deny that animals have 
intentional states, will be attracted to the idea that there are distinct kinds or 
levels of  intentionality. Indeed, Dennett suggests that a failure to distinguish 
these levels lies at the root of  many philosophical misconceptions about 
belief.1 
 There have, however, been few attempts to develop a rounded two-level 
theory of  mind. Few theorists have sought to integrate the literature on 
acceptance with that on active judgement, or to link either with work on the 
role of  language in thought. (Writers on acceptance tend to focus instead on 
technical questions about the rationality of  flat-out belief  and its relation to 
graded belief.) Dennett is one of  the few exceptions here, drawing on a 
number of  sources in a richly suggestive paper on opinion (Dennett 1978, 
chapter 16). However, he does not work out his ideas in a systematic way, and, 
like his predecessors, has little to say about the cognitive role of  opinions. The 
central psychological questions remain unanswered. What exactly are opinions? 
How are they formed and processed? What role do they play in reasoning and 
decision-making? And why do we need them as well as beliefs? 
 This paper aims to remedy some of  these omissions. I begin by outlining 
some contrasting aspects of  belief  which indicate the need for a two-level 
theory. I then look at Dennett’s proposals and highlight some of  their 
limitations. The principal of  these, I argue, is a failure to find any real cognitive 
role for opinion. I go on to outline an alternative proposal which remedies this 
defect. I describe a mechanism by which opinions could influence reasoning 
and action and identify a distinctive cognitive role for them. A final section 
returns the discussion to Dennett, comparing the position sketched here with 
his and arguing that it is superior.  
 
2. The bifurcation of  belief 
The idea that the concept of  belief  is ambiguous has some attractions. The 
concept is a rich – some would say messy – one, with roots in subjective 
experience, ordinary language and commonsense psychology. And there is little 
agreement about the nature of  the thing it refers to. There are deep and 
                                                 
1  See the references to ‘opinion’ in Dennett 1987; see also Dennett 1991c, p.143, and 
Dennett 1994, p.241. 
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seemingly intractable disputes about the ontology, semantics, and epistemology 
of  belief, about its possession conditions, causal role, and relation to language. 
Reading the literature, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that opposing theorists 
sometimes have different phenomena in mind and are simply talking past each 
other. I want to begin by focusing on four contrasting aspects of  belief, each 
of  which suggests an underlying duality.2 None of  them provides conclusive 
proof, of  course, and there are ways of  incorporating them into a unified 
account, but they provide the raw material for a two-level alternative.3 
Activation 
Propositional attitudes, such as belief, can manifest themselves both as episodic 
events and as persisting states. We are often conscious of  actively thinking that 
something is the case. For example, just now I was reflecting that the weather 
is unseasonably warm and thinking that it would be wise to turn the thermostat 
down. Episodes of  active thinking like this are sometimes called occurrent beliefs. 
Of  course, at any given moment we have lots of  beliefs that are not occurrent. 
For example, a few moments ago I firmly believed, among other things, that 
cider is made from apples, that Paris is the capital of  France and that my 
surname begins with an ‘F’ – though I was not in fact thinking of  any of  those 
things. Persisting doxastic states of  this kind are usually called standing-state or 
dispositional beliefs. Now not all theories of  belief  give equal weight to both its 
occurrent and standing-state forms. Some theories – we might call them 
occurrentist ones – treat occurrent belief  as primary. They hold that beliefs are 
cognitively inert until occurrently activated, and treat standing-state beliefs as 
dispositions to form occurrent ones (a disposition which might be realized in 
the form of  a memory trace, say).4 By contrast, another group of  theories – let 
us call them dispositionalist – treat standing-state belief  as primary. They identify 
such beliefs with dispositions to overt behaviour, and hold that they can 
manifest themselves directly in action without prior occurrent activation.5 
                                                 
2  For another approach to the ambiguity of belief, involving a fourfold classification, see 
Horst 1995. 
3  Note that all the distinctions below are drawn in terms of function or constitution, not content. 
In distinguishing different kinds of belief, I shall assume, for the sake of argument, that the 
same range of contents is available to both. 
4  Most versions of the representational theory of mind are occurrentist, in this sense (see e.g. 
Fodor 1987). For a very clear statement of an occurrentist position, see Goldman 1970, 
chapter 4. 
5  This means, of course, that the dispositionalist must deny that beliefs cause actions in the 
way that events cause their effects. For a well-known dispositionalist position, see Dennett 
1987. 
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 Which view is the commonsense one? Intuitions pull both ways. Occurrent 
beliefs often seem to play a crucial role in the production of  action. I am 
driving to work as usual. Suddenly, it occurs to me that roadworks are due to 
start today, and I decide to take a different route. I do so, moreover – or so it 
seems to me – precisely because the thought about the roadworks consciously 
occurred to me. If  it had not done so, I would not, ceteris paribus, have 
changed course. Yet many beliefs seem to influence action without occurrent 
activation. Think, for example, of  the numerous beliefs that guide your routine 
behaviour when driving: that one should drive on the left (in Britain, at any 
rate), that one should stop at a red light, that it is illegal to exceed the speed 
limit, and so on for countless others. It is because one has these beliefs that 
one drives as one does, and it would be perfectly natural to cite them in 
explanation of  one’s driving behaviour. Yet few of  us entertain them 
occurrently as we drive – at least not consciously. Again, it is plausible to think 
that animals have beliefs and desires which influence their behaviour; rather 
less plausible to think that they have occurrent beliefs. (As Malcolm puts it, it 
would sound funny to say of  an animal that a thought occurred to him, or struck 
him, or went through his mind; see Malcolm 1973).  
 Now if  you hold that beliefs have to be occurrently activated in order to 
influence action, then you will have to say that actions like these, apparently 
initiated without occurrent thought, are in fact the product of  non-conscious 
analogues of  it. This is a worrisome claim, however. For one thing, it is not 
clear that there would be time for all the necessary non-conscious occurrent 
beliefs to occur. (Think, again, of  all the beliefs that are relevant to your 
moment-by-moment actions when driving in traffic.) Dispositionalist theorists 
are in a rather better position here: a huge number of  dispositions can manifest 
themselves simultaneously in a single action. (Indeed, a disposition will only 
manifest itself  against a background of  many others.) However, the 
dispositionalist has a corresponding problem in accounting for occurrent 
belief, understood as a precursor of  action. If  beliefs just are behavioural 
dispositions, then it is hard to see how they could be activated in any way short 
of  overt behavioural manifestation.  
 We have a stand-off, then: some cases seem to be best described in 
occurrentist terms, others in dispositionalist ones. Given this, it is tempting to 
wonder if  the two theories might each characterize a distinct level of  cognition 
– to wonder, that is, if  there might be two distinct kinds of  belief, one requiring 
occurrent activation, the other not. At any rate, it is a hypothesis worth 
investigating.  
 5 
Control  
It is widely accepted that we have no direct control over what we believe. 
Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the opposite claim – that beliefs can be 
acquired at will – is not only false, but incoherent in some way (see e.g. 
O’Shaughnessy 1980, Vol. 1, pp.21-28; Williams 1973). Now it is undeniable 
that some beliefs are passively acquired. One has only to think of  beliefs that 
derive from perception, memory and simple inferential processes. Yet there is a 
long tradition of  thinking that we have the power to decide what attitude to take 
towards a proposition, through an act of  deliberate judgement. (Indeed, many 
philosophers would have identified what I have been calling occurrent beliefs with 
acts of  deliberate judgement.) Aspects of  commonsense mentalistic discourse 
also lend support to such a view. We speak of  trying to believe, of  refusing to 
believe, of  having a duty to believe, of  needing to believe, and so on. These 
idioms are often dismissed as pointing, at most, to the possibility of  indirectly 
inducing belief, by exposing oneself  to belief-forming influences. But there is 
another commonsense idiom which suggests that we are capable of  more than 
this. This is our talk of  making up and changing our minds. We often refer to 
such episodes, and speak of  them as free intentional actions (we urge the 
indecisive to make up their minds and blame the inconstant for changing 
them). Of  course, sometimes, when we speak of  a person having made up 
their mind, we mean that they have made a decision to do something – that 
they have formed an intention, not a belief. But this does not exhaust the 
idiom. We also speak of  making up or changing our minds about matters of  
fact – about the truth of  a theory, say, or the safety of  a course of  action, or 
the honesty of  a politician (see Baier 1979). That is to say, we allow that some 
doxastic attitudes can be objects of  decision. And since not all such attitudes are 
formed in this way, this again points to a bifurcation in our notion of  belief. 
Degree  
When we think about the role of  belief  in guiding action, it is very tempting to 
regard it as a continuously graded state, reflecting degrees of  confidence. The 
thought goes like this. We frequently have to decide what to do without being 
completely sure of  the facts. For example, suppose you are trying to decide 
what to buy for dinner. You are tempted to buy beef, but believe there is a 
small risk it may be infected with a deadly disease. 6 How do you decide? Well, 
buying beef  will have very different outcomes depending on whether or not it 
is infected. So the rational way to proceed would be to consider how desirable or 
                                                 
6  The presence of BSE, or ‘mad cow disease’, in British cattle, and the recent discovery of 
evidence that the disease can spread to humans, has lead some British consumers to form this 
belief. 
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undesirable you find each of  these outcomes and how confident you are that the 
meat is or is not infected. That is, you should consider the utility of  buying 
beef  relative to each background condition (infection present vs. infection not 
present), weighting this value in each case by your confidence in the existence of  
that condition. Summing these values will give you a measure of  the expected 
utility of  buying beef. If  this is lower than that for not buying it, then you 
should not buy. This strategy can be generalized to yield a global procedure for 
rational decision-making – Bayesian decision theory, as it is called. Of  course, few 
people actually make decisions by doing Bayesian calculations – at least not at a 
conscious level. Nevertheless, people can be interpreted as adhering to Bayesian 
principles: their preferences, as manifest in their behaviour, can interpreted as 
maximizing expected utility, in Bayesian fashion, relative to certain assignments 
of  utility to outcomes and of  confidence to propositions (see, for example, 
Maher 1993, pp.9ff).  
 The important thing to notice about this is that Bayesian theory speaks 
only of  degrees of  confidence and utility; it finds no role for a notion of  flat-
out or unqualified belief  or desire.7 It makes no sense to ask whether a person 
believes flat-out that beef  is safe, only how confident they are of  its safety – and, 
consequently, how much they are prepared to stake on it. Some theorists 
conclude that belief  talk should be interpreted as, or replaced by, talk of  
degrees of  confidence (Jeffrey 1970, pp.160-1). This view, however, seems to 
conflict with the commonsense view of  the matter. For it means that we fully 
believe very few things and completely disbelieve almost nothing.8 Yet we often 
want to make claims to knowledge; and it would seem odd to say that one 
knows that p, but does not fully believe it. Again, we would normally think it 
irrational to believe both a proposition and its contradictory. Yet if  beliefs are 
degrees of  confidence, we do this all the time. It is a requirement of  rationality 
that, if  you have confidence of  degree n in proposition p, then you should have 
confidence of  degree 1-n in the proposition Not-p. So, excepting rare cases of  
complete certainty, no rational person will believe a proposition without 
simultaneously believing its contradictory to some degree. The Bayesian 
account also seems to have no place for the attitude manifested in deliberate 
                                                 
7  Distinguish confidence assignments (or subjective probabilities as they are sometimes called) 
from flat-out beliefs in objective probabilities. To say that Jack has confidence of degree 0.8 in 
proposition p (or, equivalently, assigns a subjective probability of 0.8 to p) is quite a different 
thing from saying that he believes flat-out that the objective probability of p is 0.8. The two 
attitudes differ both in form and content. 
8  According to the Bayesian, you should not assign a probability of 1 to a proposition 
unless you are willing to bet everything you have on its truth. For, you should then attach a 
probability of 0 to its negation – and should therefore discount entirely the disutility of any 
outcome contingent on its falsehood. 
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judgement. The point of  making up your mind about something is to settle 
categorically what you think of  it – at least until further consideration. And this 
attitude is binary, not graded: for any proposition p you either have, or have 
not, made up your mind that p. Of  course, you might make up your mind that 
p has a certain objective probability – but then it is the proposition that is graded, not 
your attitude to it. A final problem for the Bayesian is what to say about 
conscious reasoning. As I said, this very rarely takes a Bayesian form – people 
find statistical procedures hard to apply and generally prefer classical non-
Bayesian methods. For example, we often use the practical syllogism. We reason 
that we want p, believe that p requires q, and so decide to try to bring it about 
that q. Here we treat beliefs as ungraded, binary states. Even when we do make 
explicit assessments of  probability, we tend to use these as premises in classical 
reasoning. If  the Bayesian is right, however, classical reasoning of  this kind is 
irrelevant to the rationality of  our actions (see de Sousa 1971, p.57).  
 So here is another tension in our commonsense notion of  belief. On the 
one hand, it seems to be a continuously graded state, like length or mass; on 
the other a binary one, like being more than 3 feet long. Many theorists 
conclude that we need two distinct doxastic concepts: a concept of  partial belief, 
reflecting degrees of  confidence, and a concept of  flat-out belief – usually called 
acceptance – which is binary. Now this is not yet to say that these concepts pick 
out distinct psychological phenomena: perhaps we could think of  acceptance 
as a certain level of  confidence – say, exceeding 0.5. It is, however, widely 
agreed that this will not do. It is easy to show that, given certain plausible 
assumptions about rationality, there is no level of  confidence which could be 
either necessary or sufficient for acceptance.9 Acceptance seems to be 
genuinely distinct from partial belief.  
Language  
It is sometimes claimed that natural language can act, not only as a vehicle for 
the expression of  thoughts, but as itself  a medium of  thought. We can coin 
thoughts, it is suggested, in the very act of  articulating them – often in the 
form of  subvocalized, self-directed speech (recent advocates include 
Carruthers 1996; Dennett 1991a; Gaulker 1994). There is some introspective 
evidence for this view, and a powerful argument can be run for the view that 
conscious propositional thinking occurs in natural language (Carruthers 1996, 
1998). Of  course, it is implausible to suppose that all thinking occurs in natural 
language – animals and prelinguistic infants can think after all. So here, again, 
                                                 
9  The arguments invoke the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface; see Kaplan 1996, 
chapter 3; Maher 1993, pp.133ff. 
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there is a motive for distinguishing two different kinds of  thought – linguistic 
and nonlinguistic.  
 
3. Dennett’s opinions 
In four different respects, then, the concept of  belief  bifurcates. Can we see a 
pattern here? Do the divisions indicate the presence of  two distinct kinds of  
state? Dennett suggests so; ordinary language, he claims, conflates beliefs with 
opinions. Beliefs, according to Dennett, are dispositional states: to believe that p 
is simply to be disposed to behave in the way that a rational p-believer would, 
given one’s other beliefs and desires. Both humans and animals have beliefs. 
Opinions, on the other hand, are a more sophisticated kind of  state. In 
characterizing them, Dennett draws on Ronald de Sousa’s work on acceptance 
(de Sousa 1971). It is, as I said, implausible to think of  acceptance as a state of  
confidence. Instead, de Sousa suggests, we should think of  it as a behavioural 
state, initiated by an act of  assent. This, he explains, is a linguistic activity: to 
assent to a sentence is, as it were, to make a bet on its truth – to add it to one's 
stock of  sentences labelled ‘True’. Episodes of  occurrent belief  are in fact, de 
Sousa suggests, acts of  assent, motivated by our low-level beliefs and desires – 
specifically our epistemic ones. We have, as it were, a lust for truth – a hankering 
for objects of  unqualified epistemic virtue – and it is this which prompts us to 
assent to plausible sentences. A theory of  this kind, de Sousa notes, can 
reconcile a Bayesian model of  reasoning with the classical one. Each operates 
at a different level; Bayesian theory applies to low-level deliberative processes, 
the classical model to verbalized thinking, which proceeds by leaps of  outright 
assent.  
 Dennett endorses de Sousa’s proposal, and suggests that it also helps to 
illuminate the processes of  change and making up of  mind. In general, he 
suggests, these involve a sort of  behavioural commitment. This is most obvious in 
the cases of  practical decision – where one makes up one’s mind to do 
something. But theoretical makings up of  mind, he suggests, are similar: they 
too involve commitment – the leap of  epistemic faith which de Sousa calls 
assent. In making such a leap, one passes from a generic desire for truths to a 
commitment to a particular presented sentence. The state generated by such an 
act – what Dennett calls an opinion – is not one of  belief, but more like 
commitment or ownership, and it may outlast or diverge from the agent's low-
level beliefs, as manifest in their actions. (It is when such divergences occur, 
Dennett suggests, that we fall into self-deception and akrasia; Dennett 1978, 
p.307). Although Dennett follows de Sousa in emphasizing the active 
dimension of  opinion formation, he is careful to add that not all opinions are 
the products of  active decision. We can also collect sentences unthinkingly – 
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often, he suggests, because we see them as sure bets. Most of  us, for example, 
routinely accept what we are told, unless we have reason to suspect deceit. 
What is distinctive of  opinion is, not its aetiology, but the attitude of  personal 
commitment it manifests. 
 Dennett’s proposal is attractive. It neatly accounts for the competing 
intuitions we noted above. We have low-level beliefs, which are passively 
formed, graded, and non-verbal, and which manifest themselves as behavioural 
dispositions. And we also have opinions, which display the opposite 
characteristics. Despite this, I think the account needs substantial revision. I 
have two small worries and one big one. The first concerns the role of  
language. I suspect that Dennett is right to say that change and making up of  
mind involve language. But it is implausible to think that they involve betting 
on particular sentences. I may remember having made up my mind about some 
matter (that a certain politician is untrustworthy, say), without being able to 
remember precisely the words I used to frame the thought. If  I were bilingual, 
I might even forget which language I had used. Likewise, it seems possible to 
form indexicalized opinions (to decide, for example, that that politician is 
untrustworthy). But then it would be necessary to modify the sentence on which 
one was prepared to bet in order to accommodate changes in the way its 
subject was presented. This would involve something more like the adoption 
of  a policy than a bet on a sentence. 
 Secondly, Dennett follows de Sousa in identifying episodes of  occurrent 
belief  with acts of  opinion formation – that is, of  judgement or making up of  
mind. Now I agree that some occurrent beliefs are such; but not all of  them. 
Recall my occurrent belief  about the roadworks, which led me to take a 
different route to work. In entertaining that thought I was not making up my 
mind about anything, but recalling something I already knew. It is not clear how 
episodes of  this kind fit into Dennett’s picture. 
 Now to the big worry. It concerns the cognitive role of  opinion. What exactly 
does one commit oneself  to, in betting on a sentence? Here there is a deep 
tension in Dennett’s position. Although he insists that one is committed to 
one’s opinions, he consistently writes as if  the commitment involved is slight, 
and predominately verbal.10 Thus, he often identifies opinion formation with 
the sort of  intellectual assent that lacks real conviction (1978, pp.307-8; 1987, 
p.19n), and denies that opinions play any direct role in guiding behaviour: 
It is my beliefs and desires that predict my behaviour directly. My opinions can 
be relied on to predict my behaviour only to the degree, normally large, that 
                                                 
10  His favourite example of an opinion is a bit of arcane information he once picked up 
from a play. It is, he implies not exactly something he believes, but, given suitable inducement – 
in a quiz, say – he might bet on its truth (Dennett 1978, p.306). 
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my opinions and beliefs are in rational correspondence, i.e., roughly as Bayes 
would have them. (1978, pp. 306-7) 
Opinions, it seems, are just sentences which one has picked up and is disposed 
to avow as true.11  
 Now in this Dennett is following the majority of  acceptance-theorists. 
Acceptance is usually thought of  as an intellectual attitude, motivated by 
narrowly cognitive ends (more precisely, by a desire to maximize cognitive utility – 
that is, to assert maximally true and comprehensive theories). So scientists may, 
after due investigation, decide to accept a theory as true for the purposes of  
future research, and may categorically assert its truth in their writings. But, 
theorists claim, this should have no influence on how they act outside the 
context of  enquiry: as Maher insists, the decision to accept a theory should not 
affect one’s willingness to act as if  it is true in practical contexts (Maher 1993, 
p.150).12 The reason for this is simple. The fact that you have accepted a 
proposition does not make it more probable, and should not, therefore, make 
you more confident of  its truth (excepting cases of  self-fulfilling prophecies, 
such as ‘I won’t get to sleep tonight’). Nor, in most cases, will it alter your 
practical utilities (deliberation is about achieving one's ends, not about changing 
them). So if  the rational action to choose is the one determined, in Bayesian 
fashion, by one’s assignments of  confidence and utility, then acceptance should 
not alter a rational person’s choices. To allow it to do so is, for the Bayesian, to 
lapse into irrationality. As the remark quoted above indicates, Dennett takes a 
similar view: one’s opinions may predict one’s behaviour, but they do not actively 
guide it. 
 Now if  opinion were an attitude which manifested itself  only in the 
context of  academic inquiry, then this would be unobjectionable. But that is 
not Dennett’s view. For he identifies opinion formation with making up of  
mind and occurrent belief. And these seem, on the face of  it, to have immense 
practical influence. We can make up our minds about mundane matters, such as 
whether beef  is safe to eat, the salesman trustworthy, or the weather 
threatening enough to justify taking an umbrella. And such decisions have 
significant behavioural consequences. If  I make up my mind that eating beef  is 
unsafe, then it is natural to suppose that this will affect, not only what I say, but 
what I eat. The same goes for occurrent belief. We entertain all manner of  
                                                 
11  That Dennett thinks of opinion as a rather superficial phenomenon is confirmed by his 
later references to it. He typically invokes the concept to account for features of human 
cognition which conflict with his basic commitment to an ascriptivist view of the mind. See 
the references to ‘opinion’ in his 1987.  
12  This is not to deny that there is a connection between what a person accepts and how they 
behave in practical contexts; both, after all, are determined by the same set of underlying 
assignments of confidence and utility. 
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occurrent thoughts, and they seem to have a profound effect on what we do 
(recall my occurrent belief  about the roadworks, which caused me to take a 
different route to work). So there is a tension here. On the one hand, Dennett 
wants to deny that opinions have a direct role in the guidance of  action; on the 
other, he wants to identify them with conscious occurrent beliefs – episodes 
which do have such a role. He could diffuse the tension, of  course, by denying 
that conscious occurrent beliefs directly influence action. Indeed, there are 
passages in his writing which suggest such a view (see, e.g., Dennett 1969 
p.123, p.154; 1978 chapter 9, and 1987, p.91). But it is, I think, an implausible 
one. 
 
4. A cognitive mechanism for opinion 
Is there a way of  squaring this circle? – that is, of  identifying a role for 
opinions in rational decision-making, without giving up Bayesianism? We have 
already seen that it would be irrational to allow opinions to feed into regular 
Bayesian reasoning.13 Perhaps, then, we should think of  opinion-based 
reasoning as constituting a separate system, which interacts with the belief-
desire one only at certain points. (Such a distinction of  levels would be more in 
the spirit of  de Sousa’s original proposal.) I think this is right, but it 
immediately raises a host of  questions. What is the relation between the 
opinion system and the belief-desire one? How and when do they interact? 
And how does opinion-based reasoning work? What procedures does it use? 
We have identified opinions with conscious occurrent thoughts, but conscious 
reasoning is radically enthymematic. We think ‘Beef  is unsafe’ and thereupon 
avoid it. We do not add ‘Consuming unsafe food damages one’s health’, ‘Good 
health is desirable’, and so forth. Are the suppressed premises supplied 
somehow? And if  so, by what means? (If  the system’s database contains only 
those propositions which have been explicitly assented to or consciously 
articulated, then it seems unlikely to contain them.)  
 I have a suggestion. It is that opinions are actively processed at a personal 
level. Forming an opinion, I suggest, involves committing oneself  to an 
extended policy or strategy of  reasoning – to taking the accepted proposition as a 
premise in one’s deliberate conscious reasoning, both practical and theoretical. 
Executing such a policy would also involve various personal activities: keeping 
track of  the premise, working out what conclusions it entails or which 
intentions it justifies, then deliberately accepting these conclusions and 
executing those intentions. Similarly, I suggest, one can form opinion-level 
                                                 
13  Indeed, if opinions were flagged as unqualifiedly true, it would be potentially disastrous. If 
you assign a proposition a probability of 1 then, according to the Bayesian, you should be 
prepared to stake anything at all on its truth. 
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desires by adopting some state of  affairs as a goal in one’s conscious reasoning, 
and regulating one’s future deliberations accordingly. In effect, what I am 
suggesting is that the mechanisms of  opinion-based reasoning are intentional. 
Opinions influence our behaviour because we want them to do so – because, 
having given them the status of  premises and goals, we want to perform the 
actions they dictate and to draw the conclusions they license. 14 
 This suggestion is really just an extension of  de Sousa’s original proposal. 
According to him, the processes of  assent are driven by our low-level beliefs 
and desires. As enquirers after truth, we want to collect true sentences, and this 
desire prompts us to assent to likely candidates when they present themselves. 
Of  course, these epistemic desires are usually not conscious. Nevertheless, they 
motivate acts of  assent, and must be cited in explanation of  them. My proposal 
is similar, but more wide-ranging. I suggest that we desire, not only to assent to 
true propositions in the context of  inquiry, but also to take them as premises in 
our practical reasoning. (I shall say more shortly about why we have this desire 
and what ends it serves.) And if  we believe that a previously adopted premise 
mandates a certain action – either another act of  acceptance or some overt 
activity – then we will want to perform it precisely because it is so mandated. 
Again, like de Sousa, I am not suggesting that the low-level beliefs and desires 
which drive the opinion system are entertained consciously. (Indeed, I contend 
that those mental states which issue in conscious occurrent thoughts are not 
beliefs at all, but opinions.) Note, too, that it is not essential to this account that 
all opinions are the product of  active decision. I agree with Dennett that 
opinions can be formed unthinkingly, as a result, say, of  uncritically accepting 
something one is told (as I accepted what I was told about the roadworks). The 
defining mark of  an opinion is not its origin, but one’s attitude to it. An 
opinion is a proposition to whose truth one is committed, and which one is 
disposed to employ as a premise in one’s conscious reasoning. 
 Let me illustrate all this with an example. Take the case where I make up 
my mind that beef  is unsafe. This leads to my acquiring some new low-level 
beliefs – not beliefs about beef, but beliefs about myself  and my cognitive 
commitments.15 For one thing, I come to believe that I have formed the opinion 
                                                 
14  The account outlined here is inspired in part by Jonathan Cohen's work on acceptance 
(Cohen 1992). Cohen, too, thinks of acceptance as involving commitment to a policy of 
premising. However, like other acceptance-theorists, he remains ambivalent about its cognitive 
role. Our acts of acceptance, he suggests, play no causal role in the production of our actions, 
and serve merely to rationalize them (1992, p.64). 
15  There is a ongoing debate as to whether accepting a proposition, p, requires or produces 
belief in p (See Cohen 1992; Clarke 1994). I propose to remain neutral on this; all I want to 
insist on is that accepting p normally produces belief in the proposition that one has accepted p. 
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that beef  is unsafe.16 (I do not actively form that belief, of  course. All I do is decide 
to endorse the proposition; I come to believe that I have done so as a result of  
normal subpersonal mechanisms of  self-awareness and belief-fixation.) Now 
suppose I am debating what food to buy. I recall my opinion of  the danger of  
beef. I see that, given my background beliefs and desires, it dictates that I 
should not eat beef, and, therefore, since I do not want to buy food I will not 
consume, that I should not buy it either. So I believe that I have an opinion 
which commits me to choosing something other than beef. Since I have a 
general desire to act upon my opinions, I decide to do just that. 
 It may seem odd to suggest that my behaviour in this case is motivated, not 
by beliefs about beef, but by beliefs about my opinions and their commitments. 
Surely the reason I avoid beef  is not that I believe my opinions commit me to 
avoiding it, but simply that I think it unsafe? Well, yes and no. We are 
supposing, remember, that the commonsense concept of  belief  is ambiguous 
between low-level belief  and opinion. And this means that psychological 
explanations will be ambiguous, too – sometimes citing low-level beliefs, 
sometimes opinions. First-person explanation, I suspect, is very often of  the 
latter kind. We tend to cite the content of  our opinions rather than our beliefs, 
since it is these that are present to our conscious minds. And this is just what I 
would do in the present case: I would say simply that I thought beef  was 
unsafe. And this explanation would be correct. That opinion played a crucial 
role in the generation of  my action. If  I had not formed it, or had 
subsequently forgotten it, I would not have acted as I did. Moreover, the 
opinion-invoking explanation is a genuinely intentional one. My opinion 
influenced my action precisely in virtue of  its semantic content. If  it had had a 
different content, it would not, ceteris paribus, have generated that action. For 
I would then not – again, ceteris paribus – have believed that it warranted the 
action, and would therefore not have been moved to perform it. So there is, as 
we would expect, a perfectly good intentional explanation of  my action which 
cites only my attitude to the content beef  is unsafe. There is also, however, 
another, quite different, explanation of  my action – and one rather less easy for 
me to formulate – couched in terms of  my low-level beliefs about my opinions 
and their commitments. 
 But doesn’t the existence of  this second explanation undermine the first? 
If  my action can be adequately explained in terms of  my low-level beliefs and 
desires, doesn’t this mean that the opinion-based one is redundant – that my 
opinion was, in effect, causally idle? No: no more than the existence of  a 
physical explanation for my action means that the psychological one is idle. 
The two are pitched at quite different levels. The opinion system is not an 
                                                 
16  Of course, the belief might not be conceptualized in quite this way. 
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adjunct to the belief-desire one: it supervenes on it. Our opinions come to have 
the role they do in the aetiology of  action precisely in virtue of  our low-level 
beliefs and desires about them. My opinion about beef  leads me to refrain 
from buying beef  precisely because I believe it warrants such a course of  action. 
We should not think of  the opinion system as interacting with the belief-desire 
one, but as realized in it. It is, as it were a softwired feature of  the human brain, 
implemented in more basic, low-level intentional processes.17  
 There are, then, two distinct strategies of  psychological explanation 
available to us. Suppose you know my opinions and goals. Then you could 
predict my behaviour directly from them. You would just have to think of  
them as simple functional states with roles like those of  beliefs and desires. 
Alternatively, you could make the same prediction on the basis of  my beliefs 
and desires about my opinions. Each predictive strategy would have its 
advantages. The opinion-level route would be quicker and easier, the belief-
desire one both more comprehensive (it would predict actions that were not 
opinion-generated, as well as those that were) and more reliable (it would work 
in cases where more powerful beliefs and desires interfered, preventing me 
from acting on my opinions). In this way, opinion talk fits nicely into the 
layered framework of  explanatory stances that Dennett elsewhere describes 
(1987, chapter 2). Just as some events, in addition to having physical 
explanations, also have teleological and intentional explanations, so some 
events have yet a fourth kind of  explanation. The trade-off  between simplicity 
and accuracy is typical of  the relation between different explanatory stances 
(see Dennett 1991d).  
 We can now deal with the worries mentioned above. The most serious 
concerned the rationality of  opinion-based action. Won’t it be irrational for 
people to allow their opinions to influence their behaviour – won’t it involve a 
departure from Bayesian norms? No: not if  the influence is exerted in the way 
described above, via their low-level beliefs and desires about their opinions. For 
the same action can be justified both on classical grounds, as dictated by one’s 
opinions, and on Bayesian grounds, as warranted by one’s opinion-related 
probabilities and desirabilities. All we have to suppose is that opinion formers 
habitually attach a high desirability precisely to acting upon their opinions. Then, in 
so doing, they will not be departing from Bayesian norms; but displaying their 
adherence to them. The fallacy in the original worry was to suppose that an act 
of  assent could influence action only by raising the agent’s confidence in the 
proposition assented to. And this is not so. Assenting to p should not make one 
more confident that p, though it should make one – massively – more 
                                                 
17  For this reason I have elsewhere referred to it as a virtual processor and to its states as virtual 
beliefs. See my 1998. 
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confident that one has assented to p. Given some appreciation of  p’s semantic 
powers, and a general desire to act on one’s opinions, this may well be 
sufficient to motivate courses of  action that hitherto seemed less than optimal.  
 The reader may suspect some sleight-of-hand here. If  it would be irrational 
to assign p maximum probability in one’s practical reasoning, how could it be 
rational to assign a high desirability to acting as if  it were unqualifiedly true? 
Well, it certainly would not be rational to act as if  p were true in all contexts. It 
would not be rational for me to avow that beef  is unsafe in a context where 
false assertions were penalized with instant death and true ones rewarded with 
a halfpenny. But this is not to say that in such a case I would abandon my 
opinion. I might continue to regard it as the soundest view of  the matter, and 
still use it as a basis for action in less momentous contexts. It is just that in this 
particular case the desire to act on my opinions would be overridden by 
prudential considerations. 
 What about the other problem I mentioned earlier – the enthymematic 
nature of  conscious reasoning? Again, I think my account offers a solution. 
For it does not require opinions to be, as it were, self-motivating. Their influence 
upon action is mediated by our low-level beliefs about them and their warrant. 
And the mediating beliefs need not relate solely to our explicitly entertained 
opinions. What leads me to refrain from buying beef  is not that I believe that 
my opinion that beef  is unsafe warrants such action on its own, but that I believe 
it warrants it given certain obvious background assumptions – that beef  is a food, that 
unsafe food damages one’s health and so on. We could think of  these 
assumptions as objects of  implicit acceptance – tacit opinions, if  you like. They are 
suppressed premises in our explicit reasoning – premises to which we would 
immediately assent if  questioned.18 
 Finally, let us return to the two small worries about Dennett’s position 
mentioned in the last section. The first concerned language. I said it was 
implausible to think of  opinions as attitudes to particular sentences. But this 
feature is not essential to the account, at least as developed here. In forming an 
opinion one does not so much collect a sentence as a propositional attitude, 
committing oneself  to regulating one’s conscious reasoning in ways 
characteristic of  the attitude adopted. Now in fact I believe that language will 
usually play an important role in this process: conscious reasoning, I believe, 
typically requires a linguistic vehicle.19 But this does not mean that each 
opinion must be associated with a unique sentence: the same opinion might 
                                                 
18  Distinguish tacit opinions in this sense from opinions which have been taken on trust – 
and so not actively assented to – but which have nonetheless been explicitly entertained (my 
belief about the roadworks, for example). 
19  For the argument, see my 1998. 
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assume different linguistic vehicles on different occasions. The second 
objection concerned the role of  occurrent thoughts which (like my belief  
about the roadworks) involve the recollection of  an opinion rather than its 
formation. Dennett’s account had no role for such thoughts. But mine has. The 
conscious recollection of  an opinion is just a prelude to its employment in 
conscious reasoning.  
 Note, by the way, that the account developed here justifies a commonsense 
intuition about occurrent thought. It is natural to think that conscious 
occurrent beliefs influence action precisely in virtue of  the fact that they are 
conscious. (If  I had not consciously recalled that the roadworks were due to 
start, I would not have changed course.) The present account explains this. For 
if  conscious occurrent beliefs are opinions, and if  opinions influence action in 
the way suggested, then conscious recollection will be a precondition for such 
influence. An opinion is a proposition that one is committed to employing as a 
premise in one’s conscious reasoning. And it is trivial that becoming conscious is a 
precondition for being employed in conscious reasoning. Opinions can influence 
reasoning and action specifically as opinions only if  they are consciously recalled. 
 The reader may spy a worry here. I am claiming that opinions have to be 
consciously recalled in order to influence action. But I have also claimed that 
opinions influence action in virtue of  mediating low-level beliefs and desires 
about them. And I do not want to claim that low-level states need to be 
occurrently entertained – certainly not consciously entertained – in order to 
influence action. How can I reconcile these two claims? If  all the appropriate 
mediating beliefs and desires were in place, why couldn’t an opinion do its 
work without conscious tokening? The question is understandable, but 
misrepresents my proposal. The desire which drives the opinion-system is not 
simply a desire to treat suitable propositions as unqualifiedly true – a desire 
which might indeed manifest itself  without conscious thought – but a desire to 
treat them as such in one’s conscious reasoning. The desire is specific to the context 
of  reflective conscious thought. Of  course, it might have cognitive effects 
outside of  this context – as will other opinion-related low-level states. But it 
will do so as an independent state, not as part of  the mechanism of  opinion. 
 To sum up: we have low-level beliefs and desires, which are non-linguistic, 
graded, and passively formed, and which manifest themselves without 
occurrent tokening. And we have opinions, newly construed as premising 
policies, which have the opposite properties. They need linguistic vehicles; they 
are binary (for any proposition p, one either is, or is not, committed to using p 
as a premise); they can be actively formed through acts of  deliberate 
judgement, and they manifest themselves in conscious occurrent beliefs, which 
are in fact episodes in the formation or execution of  premising policies.  
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5. The function of  opinion 
I have claimed that we attach a high desirability to forming and acting upon 
opinions – to taking propositions as premises in our practical reasoning and to 
performing the actions they warrant. But why should we do this? What is the 
point of  the enterprise? 
 The answer, I suggest, is that it gives us personal control of  our reasoning 
processes. Much of  our behaviour is spontaneous – the product, not of  
conscious deliberation, but of  non-conscious inferential processes to which we 
have no direct access and over which we have no direct control. Think, for 
instance, of  the processes that guide one’s moment-to-moment behaviour 
when driving or navigating one’s way down a busy street. Often, this is all for 
the best (drivers know how disconcerting it can be to give conscious thought 
to what they are doing). And if  our non-conscious inferential processes were 
optimal, then we could leave all our decisions to them. In every case we would 
spontaneously do the right thing, unthinkingly. But of  course they are not 
optimal. We often find ourselves perplexed. And it is here that active 
judgement is called for. For perplexity is disturbing; we like to know what to do 
next. Indeed, we would often prefer to make a decision, even if  it is not 
optimal, than to continue in uncertainty. (Dennett gives a homely example. You 
are in a restaurant choosing from the menu. It is very hard to say what you 
really want most; but given the pressures of  time and etiquette you have to 
avow some categorical desire; Dennett 1987, p.20) So we make up our minds. 
We select a few salient propositions, of  which we feel fairly confident, and a 
few goals, which we are content to pursue, accept them as categorically true or 
desirable, and feed them into simple decision procedures, such as the practical 
syllogism. With a bit of  luck this yields a clear prescription which gets us 
moving again.  
 So here we have a powerful motive for forming opinions. Adopting explicit 
premises and goals can help to simplify complex problems and overcome 
deliberative log-jams; it furthers the ends of  practical reflection. 20 
Systematically followed through, the practice will create a distinct level of  
cognition which can be activated whenever low-level processes fail to yield a 
ready solution. Note, too, that once we have decided to adopt a particular 
                                                 
20  Of course, people can decide to take propositions as premises for other reasons. For 
example, a lawyer might decide for professional purposes to take it as a premise that her client 
is innocent. Such an decision, however, would not mark the formation of an opinion in my 
sense (the lawyer has not made up her mind that her client is innocent, and we would not 
describe her, when she entertained that proposition, as having an occurrent belief). What 
disqualifies the lawyer’s act is, I suggest, that it is motivated by local nondeliberative concerns 
– namely, a desire to do her job – rather than by a desire to further the ends of practical 
reflection. 
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premise or goal, we will generally want to stick with it and to use it as a basis 
for future deliberation. This is not because the decision affects our assessment 
of  the proposition’s probability or desirability, but simply because 
psychological consistency is itself  valuable. Continually changing one’s mind is 
a recipe for confusion and renewed perplexity. (Incorrigible vacillators can 
become incapable of  acting.) So once you have plumped for the chocolate 
cheesecake, you immediately gain an extra interest in trying to satisfy that 
desire. 
 There is another way in which opinion formation facilitates deliberative 
control. For opinion formers can select, not only the inputs to their conscious 
reasoning, but also the procedures they employ in such reasoning. I argued that 
opinions are processed at a personal level – that they motivate action in virtue 
of  our beliefs about them. So, as opinion formers, we need to have beliefs 
about what warrants what. But we do not have to rely on native wit here. We 
can engage in activities designed to generate such beliefs (executing algorithms, 
applying heuristics, running thought-experiments, etc.). Moreover, we can 
evaluate these procedures themselves, modifying or abandoning bad ones and 
acquiring new and better ones. That is to say, we can control not only what we 
think about, but how we think about it. One consequence of  this is that we can 
to some extent overcome the limitations of  our hard-wired cognitive systems. 
For example, we seem to be naturally disposed to make certain systematic 
errors in reasoning with conditionals (these show up most clearly on the 
Wason selection task; see Wason 1966). It is likely that this is a consequence of  
hard-wired features of  our brains. (It is notable that people’s performance 
improves markedly when the task is presented in such a way as to draw on their 
native skills at detecting social free-loaders; see Cosmides and Tooby 1992.) 
However, with a little training in elementary logic, we can overcome this frailty. 
Such training, I suggest, does not involve a rewiring of  the original subpersonal 
system (even logicians find the old Adam reasserting itself  occasionally). 
Rather, it results in the subject learning new personal techniques for assessing 
the logical powers of  explicitly entertained conditionals. One might, for 
example, learn to visualize the truth-table for the material conditional, thereby 
equipping oneself  with a reliable source of  beliefs about the cognitive 
commitments of  opinions with a conditional form. The acquisition of  such a 
skill would thus contribute to the installation of  a soft-wired opinion-based 
cognitive processor.  
 
6. Dennett compared 
I have argued that Dennett’s claims about opinion are vitiated by a failure to 
find any real cognitive role for opinion, and have sketched a rival account 
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which remedies this defect. In this final section, I return the discussion to 
Dennett and compare the resulting account with his.  
 First, I want to head off  a possible objection. It may be thought that the 
cost of  the new account is just too high. Won’t it involve rejecting out-of-hand 
the sort of  interpretationalist view of  the mind which Dennett advocates? The 
thought is this. I have argued that opinions influence reasoning and action in 
virtue of  our low-level beliefs about them. So if  you act upon the opinion that 
p, there will be a low-level intentional explanation of  your action which cites 
the belief  that you have that opinion. And this seems incompatible with 
interpretationalism about low-level belief. Take my food-buying activities. 
Surely, interpretational constraints would require you to ascribe to me the 
simplest low-level beliefs and desires that could adequately explain my behaviour 
– in this case, the belief  that beef  was unsafe and the desire to stay healthy – 
and not sophisticated beliefs about my opinions and their commitments? So, it 
seems, we can have either interpretationalism about low-level belief  or our new 
theory of  opinion, but not both. 
 This is too hasty. We must remember that the interpreter does not aim to 
make sense of  isolated actions, but of  patterns of  activity extending over time. 
And on the proposed account, the various mental acts involved in the formation 
and execution of  the premising policies that constitute opinions will themselves 
be candidates for intentional characterization. So in the beef-buying case what 
we have to explain is, not just that I buy something other than beef, but that I 
do so as a result of  an episode of  conscious reflection upon the content beef  is 
unsafe (itself  part of  a larger complex of  such episodes). When this wider 
context is taken into account, the simplest interpretation of  my action will be 
one that adverts to second-order beliefs of  the kind mentioned. At any rate, 
that is the claim.  
 This objection does, however, point up another possible difference with 
Dennett. For our account requires us to take a realist view of  certain kinds of  
unobservable mental behaviour. Forming opinions involves performing certain 
conscious mental actions – specifically, undertaking and executing strategies of  
reasoning. And these actions need have no overt behavioural manifestations – 
indeed, to a casual observer it might be hard to tell whether I have formed the 
opinion that beef  is unsafe, or simply believe it with a high degree of  
confidence. And this seems to rule out the sort of  anti-realism about the mind 
which Dennett favours.  
 Again, this is too hasty. It is true that Dennett is sceptical – rightly so in my 
opinion – of  the existence of  certain putative mental acts. In particular, he 
denies the existence of  the sort of  internal executive acts that are sometimes 
supposed to figure as the routine antecedents of  overt action (1991a, chapter 
8). But he does not deny that other kinds of  mental acts occur – including 
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silent verbalization, calculation, and visualization (see, e.g., Dennett 1991a, 
p.197). Now I suspect that the reason he finds acts of  these kinds 
unobjectionable is that they can be regarded as internalizations of  bits of  overt 
behaviour (so inner speech is just overt speech with the articulatory 
component suppressed). And the acts involved in opinion formation are of  
just this innocuous kind. The ability to perform explicit inferential operations 
in one's head is just a refinement of  the ability to perform them publicly, by 
manipulating external symbols. And private, self-directed commitments can be 
thought of  as internalizations of  certain sorts of  social commitment. So there 
need be no principled resistance to speaking of  such actions. Dennett would 
insist, of  course, that we may be quite wrong about the nature of  our mental 
acts. (Just because we speak of  rotating mental images, for example, it does not 
follow that there exist rotatable mental items; see Dennett 1991a, chapters 4, 
10.) But the present account does not suppose otherwise. The claim that 
occurrent beliefs are acts of  premise-adoption is an explanatory hypothesis, 
not a piece of  conceptual analysis. 
 Let us turn now to another contrast. I have recommended my story as an 
account of  how conscious occurrent beliefs could have a cognitive role. But, 
of  course, it is not the only such account around. Indeed, Dennett himself  has 
recently developed a rather different one. Nowadays, he talks less about opinion 
and more about the Joycean machine – the stream of  self-directed inner speech 
which some novelists have attempted to reproduce. Conscious occurrent 
thoughts, he suggests, are just items of  inner speech. And as such, he claims, 
they have an important cognitive role. Inner speech is channelled through a 
feedback loop linking the speech production and comprehension systems. Self-
generated sentences are processed like externally produced ones, and tend to 
produce similar behavioural effects. So asking yourself  a question may prompt 
an instinctive verbal reply containing information which you would otherwise 
have been unable to access. In this way, occurrent thought can help to focus 
attention and facilitate certain executive tasks. For example, we can engage in 
'positive thinking' – deliberately repeating encouraging or admonitory phrases 
to ourselves in order to help to modify our attitudes. We can comment on our 
own behaviour, thereby heightening our awareness of  what we are doing. We 
can engage in strategies of  self-reminding, rehearsing the benefits of  irksome 
tasks and the perils of  superficially attractive ones. And we can facilitate 
information-retrieval by practising mnemonic tricks – repeating words and 
phrases in order to build up associations that will aid recall (Dennett 1991a, 
pp.224-5, 277-8, 301-2). Dennett’s conjectures receive support from the 
literature on the role of  private speech in children – especially that inspired by 
the work of  Lev Vygotsky (Vygotsky 1962). A number of  studies have 
confirmed that the frequency of  children’s private speech – that is, of  their 
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self-directed overt vocalization – does tend to predict performance on certain 
sorts of  puzzle tasks (Berk 1992). And it seems to do so by exerting a self-
regulatory function, in much the way that Dennett describes. (It takes the form 
of  self-commentary, self-guiding remarks, and suchlike.) So here we have a rival 
account of  the cognitive role of  conscious thought – and a rather more 
economical one at that (one that does not mention second-order attitudes, for 
example). 
 Now I do not want to deny either the existence or the importance of  the 
processes Dennett describes. His account of  the Joycean machine is, I think, an 
important contribution to our understanding of  the conscious mind. But I do 
want to maintain that it is not the whole story. Indeed, it is doubtful whether 
Joycean processes should count as genuinely cognitive at all. The Joycean 
machine, as Dennett characterizes it, works by association and self-
stimulation.21 Inner verbalizations do not influence behaviour in the way that 
beliefs do – by directly initiating actions they rationalize. Rather, they influence 
action only indirectly, by evoking conditioned behavioural responses. 22 It is not 
saying the words to yourself  that has a cognitive role; it is hearing and processing 
them at a subpersonal level. Nor does the account accommodate one-off  
judgement and making up of  mind. Telling yourself  'Beef  is unsafe' does not 
constitute the formation of  a new doxastic state – though it may help to cajole 
your neural subsystems into seeing that you decline the steak tartar. 
 So there is still a role for opinion as I have characterized it. Indeed, I think 
the account sketched here meshes quite nicely with the literature on private 
speech. There is, first of  all, evidence that private speech is multi-functional (see 
Berk 1992 pp.41ff). So some private utterances could be expressions of  
opinion, even if  others are self-stimulations. Secondly, it is widely accepted 
among Vygotskian theorists that private speech is a development of  social 
speech – some even suggest that it exhibits dialogic properties (see, e.g., Ramirez 
1992). This view, I think, harmonizes well with my story about opinion, and 
may help to dispel worries about its over-intellectualization. I said that if  we are 
to act upon our opinions, then we need to know, or be able to work out, which 
actions and inferences they license. That is, we need to be able to distinguish 
sound inferential moves from unsound ones. How do we learn to do this? Well, 
in the course of  linguistic interaction with our peers; the skills we need for 
                                                 
21  For an interesting anticipation of Dennett’s account, see Skinner 1957, chapter 19. 
22  It may be objected that opinions in my sense do not influence behaviour directly either: 
their influence is mediated by low-level beliefs about them. This is true, but the mediation here 
is of a special kind. Opinion-based processes are realized in low-level psychological ones, just as 
these in turn are realized in neurological ones. At their own level opinions directly influence 
behaviour, just as beliefs and desires do at their level. 
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conscious private reasoning are just those we need for engaging in reasoned 
argument with others. Indeed, we can think of  the abilities involved in opinion-
based reasoning as internalizations of  skills first manifested in inter-personal 
argumentation (making assertions, defending them, calculating their 
commitments, accepting or rejecting these commitments, striving for 
consistency, and so on). The processes of  opinion have an inherently dialogic 
character. 
 I have a final, brief, comparison to make. It is often argued that the 
commonsense concept of  belief  is a strongly realist one – that we conceive of  
beliefs as functionally discrete states which can be individually formed and lost, 
and selectively activated in reasoning and decision-making (see Ramsey et al. 
1991; Davies 1991). Now Dennett is well-known for his hostility to this view, 
which is, he suggests, an illusion generated by our opinion-forming habits 
(Dennett 1994, p.241). But if  we take seriously the idea that opinions constitute 
a genuinely distinct level of  cognition, then an intriguing possibility opens. 
Perhaps our realist intuitions are true at least of  opinions, if  not of  beliefs. For 
opinions, understood as premising policies, fit the realist profile very well. 
Premising policies can be selectively undertaken (by datable acts of  policy 
adoption) and selectively abandoned (either by deliberate repudiation or just by 
forgetting them). And since they can be selectively recalled, they can be 
selectively executed, too. So they will be functionally discrete. Moreover, their 
discreteness depends, not on facts about the internal architecture of  our brains, 
but upon the shape of  our personal-level reasoning strategies. So with our new 
theory of  opinion, we get an extra dose of  realism about folk psychology for 
free. This is, I think, an attractive consequence.  
 
7. Conclusion 
I have tried to do two things in this paper: to show that a two-level theory of  
belief  is worth taking seriously, and to sketch a constitutive account of  one of  
those levels. The two aims are connected. For I suspect that one reason for the 
relative neglect of  two-level theories is that it has been hard to see how the 
levels would interact. It is only when we think of  the higher level as implemented 
in the lower one that this problem becomes really tractable. The present 
account is, of  course, merely a sketch. Properly developed, a two-level theory 
will have far-reaching implications, some of  which must be explored before it 
can be properly assessed. This is just a start.23 
 
                                                 
23  I am grateful to William Bechtel, George Botterill, Peter Carruthers and two anonymous 
referees for Philosophical Psychology for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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